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George A. Erickcek and Hannah McKinney

Thinking about the
Future of Small
Metropolitan Areas
An today's dynamic global economy,
the economic importance of smaller
metropolitan areas in the United States
may be declining. Many of these areas
have lost their major corporate
stakeholders through mergers and
acquisitions and have been downgraded to
"branch site" locations. Moreover, few
offer the thick labor markets and social/
cultural environment sought by
professional workers. The public policy
initiatives available to these metropolitan
areas often are very limited due to budget
and legal constraints.
We are worried about the future of
these areas and have been working to gain
a better understanding of how they grow
by identifying local public policies that
facilitate and nurture economic growth.
This article describes our current
approach and initial findings.
In brief, our aim is to identify small
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
which the U.S. Census defines as those
that housed fewer than one million
residents in 1990 that experienced
better than expected growth during the
1990s. After these "winning" MSAs are
identified, we hope to find the salient
public policies that significantly
contributed to their success.

Identifying the Better-ThanExpected Performers
To identify MSAs that have enjoyed
better-than-expected growth, it is
necessary to construct a predictive model
that estimates the expected growth of
MSAs given their economic, social, and
physical/geographic attributes. The
explanatory variables we used in our
predictive model of the growth in
personal income during the 1990s for the
261 small MSAs can be categorized into
the following four groups:
1) Structural. These variables
controlled for the MSA's industrial mix
relative to the nation's, and the economic
health of its entrepreneur/small business
base at the start of the 1990s.
2) Human capital. These variables
controlled for the educational levels of the
area's adults at the start of the decade.
3) Quality of life. These included
control variables for the area's regional
location, climate factor, and crime levels.
4) Historical trends. These variables
controlled for the area's economic
performance in the previous decade.
A full description of the regression
model and its results are available in our
forthcoming Upjohn Institute Working
Paper, "Small Cities Blues: Looking for
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Growth Factors in Small and MediumSized Cities."

we believe that the model's results point
us in the right direction.

the percentage of their residents who
completed college.

Results
The model explained 72 percent of the
variation of the dependent variable,
personal income growth, as measured by
the standard adjusted R-square statistic.
Using this model to generate the predicted
growth of all the 261 MS As, we then
ranked in order the areas according to the
difference between their actual and the
model-predicted growth during the 1990s.
The resulting top 10 metropolitan areas
are shown in Table 1. Many of the listed
metropolitan areas are well known and
have made their way to the top of major
"Best Cities" polls and indexes published
annually. Others, such as Sioux Falls,
South Dakota; Laredo, Texas; and
Fayetteville, North Carolina; are seldom
seen in the winner's circle.
Conversely, it is instructive to examine
the metropolitan areas that experienced
lower-than-expected growth as well. The
5 metropolitan areas that were the least
successful in meeting the model's growth
expectations were Melbourne, Florida;
Auburn, Alabama; Merced, California,
Fort Myers, Florida; and El Paso, Texas.
Of course, this analysis is subject to
the criticism that its results are only as
good as the accuracy of the model. It is
possible that the model's results are due to
missing or misspecified variables. Still,

Cluster Analysis

5) College places leaking graduates
(12 MSAs). These MSAs attract young
adults to their colleges but seemingly
cannot retain them after they have
graduated.

The next step in our exploratory
research was to conduct a cluster analysis
of the metropolitan areas, which sorts the
areas into homogenous groups based on
their fiscal, social, and demographic
characteristics. The variables used in the
analysis fall into four general categories:
1) education policies, 2) quality of life, 3)
governmental actions, and 4) change in
economic conditions. This statistical
analysis grouped the 261 metro areas into
the eight clusters listed and briefly
described below.
1) High sprawl, low growth (49
MS As). The strongest shared
characteristic of this group was that they
have highly fragmented local
governments.
2) Growth and prosperity (55 MS As).
These MSAs share high growth and low
poverty.
3) Low-living-costs hometowns (57
MSAs). These areas share low population
growth, low living costs, and low export
activity.
4) Forgotten and distressed (45
MSAs). The primary characteristic of
these MSAs was a loss of public funding.
In addition, they suffered from high
poverty and ranked very low in terms of

Table 1 The Top 10 Small MSAs Achieving Higher-Than-Expected Growth
in the 1990s (percent change in personal income, 1990-2000)
Actual
growth (%)

Predicted
growth (%)

Difference
(percentage point)

Laredo, TX

140.2

102.0

38.2

Fayetteville, AR

111.7

75.9

35.7

Naples, FL

147.4

114.8

32.6

Boise City, ID

128.9

100.7

28.1

Austin, TX

166.7

140.2

26.5

Santa Fe, NM

98.8

74.6

24.1

Las Vegas, NV

176.7

153.2

23.4

Sioux Falls, SD

105.8

82.6

23.2

Raleigh, NC

112.6

89.5

23.1

75.3

52.5

22.8

Metro area

Fayetteville, NC

6) Creative-class college towns (26
MSAs). These areas also attract young
adults due to their colleges and
universities but apparently are able to
keep them longer after graduation.
7) Traditional employment centers (13
MSAs). The unique feature of these
MSAs is that they have no unique
features.
8) Pulled by exogenous change (4
MSAs). These MSAs are outliers that
were seemingly impacted by an
exogenous change in their economy.
Combining the results of the two
models, we found that the MSAs
performing better than expected were
overrepresented in the "Growth and
prosperity" and, surprisingly, in the
"Traditional employment center" clusters.
They were underrepresented in the "High
sprawl, low growth" and the "Low-cost
hometown" clusters.

Next Steps
We consider our research to be still in
the exploratory stage of development. It is
clear that more detailed case studies of the
better performing metropolitan areas are
warranted. We now have a better sense of
where to look for possible effective local
economic development policies, but we
have not reached the stage of our project
that allows us to identify them.
George A. Erickcek is senior regional
analyst at the Upjohn Institute, and
Hannah McKinney is an associate
professor of economics and business at
Kalamazoo College. This article is based
on an Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper
by Erickcek and McKinney, entitled "Small
Cities Blues: Looking for Growth Factors
in Small and Medium-Sized Cities." To
read the working paper in full, please go to
http://www.upjohninstitute.org/
publications/wp/index.htm.
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Carl Davidson and Steven J. Matusz

Globalization,
Adjustment, and
Compensation
NOTE: This article highlights some of the
research findings that appear in the
authors' new book, International Trade
and Labor Markets, which was published
by the Upjohn Institute.

hile academicians generally
argue that reducing trade barriers
enhances aggregate welfare, legislation
aimed at liberalizing trade often meets
fierce opposition in public and political
arenas. Counted among the opposition are
groups concerned about the losses
suffered by workers whose jobs disappear
under the weight of import competition.
Even academic economists, who tend to
rail against protectionist sentiment,
readily admit that freer trade does harm
some groups, including those who
become displaced.
Indeed, a burgeoning literature
attempting to measure the losses to
dislocated workers has produced some
disquieting findings. For example,
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)
estimate that the average dislocated
worker suffers a loss in expected lifetime
income of $80,000. Kletzer (2001) finds
similar but less-dramatic results. In her
study, the average dislocated worker takes
a 12 percent pay cut, while the median
worker sees her wage fall by 5 percent.
Troubled by such large personal losses,
some academic economists have joined
the growing movement in the policy
community in calling for direct
compensation of workers dislocated by
trade liberalization. 1
For more than half a century the
benefits of freer trade have been
understood in the context of the

Samuelson compensation principle: the
winners gain enough from liberalization
to allow them to fully compensate the
losers without exhausting all of their
gains.2 Thus, one way of viewing those
who have been pushing for "wage
insurance" for dislocated workers is that
they are just taking this argument to its
logical conclusion if we can afford to
compensate these workers, we should.3
After all, if we choose to liberalize trade,
we must realize that we are choosing to
harm some groups. One might argue that
equity requires coupling policies aimed at
liberalizing trade with policies aimed at
compensating displaced workers.
Not everyone would find an equitybased argument for compensation

"One might argue that equity
requires coupling policies aimed
at liberalizing trade with policies
aimed at compensating displaced
workers ... even in the absence
of equity considerations,
practical political considerations
suggest coupling liberalization
with compensation."

compelling. Some might point out that the
dislocated workers were receiving
economic rents when trade barriers
protected their jobs, calling into question
policies that would provide these workers
with even more compensation by
subsidizing them when they switch
sectors. Even in the absence of equity
considerations, practical political

considerations suggest coupling
liberalization with compensation. Since
those opposed to freer trade often fight
against liberalization, an offer to
compensate displaced workers for their
losses might convince some groups to
change their position and offer support
instead, making freer trade easier to
achieve.
The academic literature is surprisingly
silent regarding the design of optimal
policies aimed at compensating displaced
workers. Indeed, there is only a modest
amount of literature devoted to any issue
related to compensating those harmed by

"The academic literature is
surprisingly silent regarding
the design of optimal policies
aimed at compensating
displaced workers."
liberalization.4 One reason is that the vast
majority of all of the academic research
connecting worker welfare and
globalization begins from a premise of
frictionless factor markets, where all
adjustments that might be motivated by
liberalization occur instantly. These
models focus on the long run and leave no
room to address many of the concerns
outlined above.
In our monograph, International Trade
and Labor Markets: Theory, Evidence,
and Policy Implications (Davidson and
Matusz 2004), we first show that
traditional trade analysis can rather easily
be extended to allow for equilibrium
unemployment, job displacement, and
gradual adjustment, and that doing so
provides many new insights. We then use
our extended model to tackle difficult
issues such as the one raised above: if
society desires to compensate those who
are harmed by liberalization, what is the
best way to go about it?
The general-equilibrium model that we
use to address the issue of optimal
compensation has several important
components that are missing from
standard trade models. In our model,
workers must first train to acquire skills
and then search for employment in either
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a "high-tech sector," where significant
skills and training are required and wages
are high, or a "low-tech sector," in which
training is quick and cheap, far fewer
skills are required, and pay is low. We
assume that workers vary in ability, and
we show that equilibrium results in all
workers with ability above a critical level
being drawn to the high-tech sector with
all other workers in low-tech jobs.
To study the issue of adjustment and
compensation, we assume that the lowtech sector is initially protected by a small
tariff and then show that liberalization
harms two groups: those low-tech

"... if society desires to
compensate those who are
harmed by liberalization, what is
the best way to go about it?"
workers who choose to shift to the hightech sector (the movers), and those
workers who remain trapped in the
(previously protected) low-tech sector
because they do not have enough skills to
make the acquisition of high-tech jobs
attractive (the stayers). The movers, who
are the displaced workers in our setting,
lose for two reasons. First, although some
wind up with better-paying jobs after
relocating, others take a pay cut when
they find reemployment in the high-tech
sector. Second, these workers bear all of
the adjustment costs imposed on the
economy by liberalization they must
first retrain and then search for new jobs,
both of which are costly processes.
We then turn to the issue of
compensation by searching for the policy
that fully compensates each group for
their losses while imposing the smallest
deadweight loss on the economy.5 One of
the advantages of our model is that it is
rich enough to allow us to compare all of
the compensation programs that have
been at the center of the policy debate:
wage subsidies, employment subsidies,
training subsidies, and unemployment
insurance (which is basically what trade
adjustment assistance has been in the
United States).

We find that there are two rules that an
optimal compensation program should
satisfy. First, a program should have a
large impact on the welfare of the average
worker in the targeted group. If that is the
case, then full compensation can be
achieved with only a modest-sized
program. Second, if we define the
marginal worker to be the worker who is
just indifferent between high- and lowtech jobs under free trade, then an optimal
program should have only a small impact
on this worker's welfare. The reason for
this is that any compensation scheme
distorts incentives and results in some
workers making inefficient labor market
decisions. If the marginal worker's
welfare is largely insensitive to the policy
measure, then full compensation can be
achieved while generating only a small
amount of labor misallocation.
Applying these two rules, we find that
it is optimal to use a wage subsidy to
compensate movers, whereas an
employment subsidy (a subsidy to
employed workers which is independent
of the wage) works best to compensate
the stayers. The main reason for the
difference in the policy prescription has to
do with the composition of the workforce
in the two sectors: the high-tech sector is
populated with high-ability workers,

"One of the advantages of our
model is that it is rich enough
to allow us to compare all of the
compensation programs that
have been at the center of
the policy debate: wage
subsidies, employment subsidies,
training subsidies, and
unemployment insurance..."
whereas the low-tech sector attracts
largely low-ability workers. As a result,
the average high-tech worker has higher
ability than the marginal worker, whereas
the average low-tech worker has an
ability level below that of the marginal
worker. With a wage subsidy, the size of
the transfer received by a worker is

increasing in the wage, which is
increasing in ability. Thus, workers with
high ability value wage subsidies more
highly than their lower-ability
counterpart. This makes the wage subsidy
an attractive tool to use when
compensating the movers the average
mover will value the program much more
than the marginal worker thus, a

"By formally modeling the
training and search processes
that are at the core of the
adjustment process, our
monograph is one of the first
rigorous treatments of the type
of policy concerns that arise
when we take into account
adjustment costs."
modest-sized program can be used,
generating only a small amount of
inefficient labor reallocation. In contrast,
the wage subsidy will lead to too much
labor reallocation if used to compensate
the stayers. This is due to the fact that the
marginal worker will value the wage
subsidy considerably more than the
average stayer (since the average stayer
has lower ability than the marginal
worker).
As there are no distortions in our
model (other than the initial tariff), we
know that the gains from trade are large
enough to fully compensate those harmed
by liberalization, but theory alone does
not tell us if the costs of the compensation
are large or small relative to the gains
from trade. To get a handle on the relative
magnitude of the costs of compensation,
we close our monograph by calibrating
the model using parameter estimates
based on U.S. labor market data. We find
that the overall cost to society is likely to
be modest, (in terms of deadweight loss)
provided the right policy is used. ,
However, attempting to compensate the
losers might completely wipe out the
gains from freer trade if the wrong policy
is used.
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The continuing rapid pace of global
integration brings with it a continuing
flow of displaced workers. It is incumbent
upon policy analysts to carefully consider
the distribution and magnitude of
adjustment costs that stem from global
shocks, and to think deeply about the
optimal design of policies targeted at
reducing those costs. By formally
modeling the training and search
processes that are at the core of the
adjustment process, our monograph is
one of the first rigorous treatments of the
type of policy concerns that arise when
we take into account adjustment costs.
Our hope is that our work demonstrates
that such issues can be tackled in tractable
settings, and that this will trigger other
academics to start taking these issues
more seriously.

Notes
1. See, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan (1993); Parsons (2000); and Kletzer
(2001).
2. This argument ignores the fact that such com
pensation is rarely offered.
3. See, for example, Baily, Burtless, and Litan
(1993); Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993);
Burtless et al. (1998); Parsons (2000); Kletzer
(2001); Kletzer and Litan (2001); and Hufbauer and
Goodrich (2001).
4. There are a small number of papers that are
relevant. First, there are those that ask whether the
losers could be compensated by the winners without
eating away all the gains from freer trade. Using a
traditional full employment model of trade, Dixit
and Norman (1980, 1986) have shown that there
does indeed exist a commodity tax scheme that can
achieve this objective thus, liberalization can lead
to a true Pareto gain. However, Brecher and
Choudhri (1994) and Feenstra and Lewis (1994)
have raised concerns about whether this scheme will
work when unemployment is present or factors of
production are not perfectly mobile.
Second, a paper by Brander and Spencer (1994)
focuses on the optimal design of a wage subsidy
program aimed at compensating dislocated workers
for their losses. In a simple partial equilibrium
model in which the distribution of wages is held
fixed, they compare wage subsidies programs in
which the subsidy is tied to the gap between the preliberalization wage and the postliberalization wage
earned by displaced workers. Their goal is to deter
mine whether the subsidy should be an increasing or
decreasing function of this gap. Their analysis finds
support for the Lawrence and Litan (1986) position
that the wage subsidy should be "tapered" that is,
they show that the optimal subsidy is decreasing in
the wage gap.
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5. As noted above, society may wish to offer
such compensation due to equity concerns or simply
to make it easier to enact liberalizing legislation.

Both Carl Davidson and Steven Matusz are
professors of economics at Michigan State
University, and external research fellows
with the Leverhulme Centre for Research
on Globalization and Economic Policy at
the University of Nottingham.
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Mini-Grant Funded Research
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facilitate the research and publications of less
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Employment Research to feature work that
has been partially supported by an Upjohn
Institute mini-grant.

The Effect of Educational Vouchers
on Academic and
Nonacademic Outcomes
Eric P. Bettinger
Robert L. Slonim
Case Western Reserve University
School vouchers are one of the most
hotly contested policies for improving the
educational opportunities of
disadvantaged students. Academic
literature on the effect of vouchers has
focused primarily on student test scores.
Although test scores are a valuable
outcome, parents and school
administrators understand that some of
the most desirable effects of education
are on behaviors not captured by these
tests, such as generosity, patience, and
self-confidence. This research provides
new data and evidence on the effects
of educational vouchers on both test
scores and these other nonacademic
behaviors.
Our research uses data from The
Children's Scholarship Fund of Toledo
(CSFT), a privately run voucher program
in Ohio. In 1998, nearly 2,500 families,
all of whom qualified for free/reduced
lunch, applied for these vouchers. The
Children's Scholarship Fund of Toledo
awarded more than 1,000 scholarships by
lottery. Because CSFT randomly chose
the scholarship winners, we can use
unsuccessful applicants as a comparison/
control group for the scholarship winners.
Having a comparison group allows us to
avoid the problem that voucher users may
differ from other students in unobservable
ways.
Our preliminary results show that
winners' test scores are about 10 percent
higher than unsuccessful applicants, that
voucher winners are about twice as likely
to attend private school after receiving the
voucher, and that parents of voucher

winners are much more likely to be
involved in their children's educations.
To measure the nonacademic
behaviors of patience, generosity, and
self-confidence, we use behavioral
experiments with real financial
consequences. In each experiment,
students were given initial endowments of
toy store gift certificates. We then allowed
students to make decisions with real
consequences. In a separate room, we
simultaneously conducted identical
experiments with the students' parents but
offered cash instead of gift certificates.
Within these experiments, we find that
voucher winners are less confident and
give larger amounts to charities. In our
preliminary results, we also find only a
small correlation between the children's
and their parents' decisions.

An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining
with Voluntary Transmission
of Private Information
Paul Pecorino
University of Alabama
Mark Van Boening
University of Mississippi
Asymmetric information is a leading
explanation of bargaining failures that
result in costly disputes. These disputes
include strikes and expensive trials or
arbitration proceedings. In the context of
civil litigation, Shavell (1989) has shown
that the informed party to a dispute has an
incentive to voluntarily reveal her private
information if she has a strong case.
When information can be revealed
credibly and costlessly, Shavell finds that
all disputes settle prior to trial. We
empirically test Shavell's result with an
experimental bargaining game. When we
allow for costless and credible
transmission of private information, we
find that 80 percent of plaintiffs with
strong cases reveal their information and
that there is a significant reduction in the
dispute rate. We also consider a "cheap
talk" treatment in which transmitted
information is not credible. In this
treatment, we find (contrary to theory)
that transmitted information is not totally
ignored, but (consistent with theory) there
is no drop in the dispute rate for any
group of plaintiffs.

Our experimental design consists of a
two-type version of the Shavell model.
Plaintiffs have either a strong case or a
weak case, where the dispute resolution
mechanism can be thought of either as a
civil trial or as a simple form of
conventional arbitration in which offers
do not affect the arbitration outcome. We
choose parameter values such that in the
absence of information transmission,
theory predicts that weak plaintiffs settle
and strong plaintiffs proceed to trial. Our
results in this baseline experiment
generally conform to the theory.
When information transmission is
possible, theory predicts that plaintiffs
with strong cases will voluntarily reveal
their private information, and as a result
their cases will eventually settle. In our
experiment, almost 80 percent of these
plaintiffs reveal their private information.
For all plaintiffs with strong cases, the
dispute rate falls from 87 percent under
the baseline to 48 percent in the
treatment. For those plaintiffs with strong
cases who reveal their private
information, the dispute rate drops to 35
percent. Another important prediction of
the theory is that silence is interpreted as
having a weak case, and this is clearly
supported by our data. Our experimental
results give a fairly strong confirmation of
Shavell's most important results, though
some anomalies do emerge in the data.
Shavell's result is significant because it
suggests which type of informational
asymmetries would or would not be
responsible for bargaining failure. In
principle, evidence that can be credibly
established to a court could also be credibly
established prior to trial, though sanctions
for perjury at trial may make it somewhat
easier to do so in the courtroom. On the
other hand, information on tastes (such as
risk preferences) can be difficult to transmit
prior to trial. Thus, asymmetric information
on preferences is likely to persist even when
opportunities for voluntary transmission of
information exist.
Reference
Shavell, Steven. 1989. "Sharing of
Information Prior to Settlement or
Litigation." Rand Journal of Economics
20(2): 183-195.

Books on Work/Family Issues
By a Thread

Kids at Work

How Child Care Centers
Hold On to Teachers,
How Teachers Build
Lasting Careers

The Value of
Employer-Sponsored
On-Site Child
Care Centers

Marcy Whitebook and Laura Sakai

Rachel Connelly, Deborah S. DeGraff,
and Rachel A. Willis

The authors examine how child care
programs and their staff subsist in a
field characterized by low pay, low
status, and high
turnover, and
what the impacts
of these factors
are on the quality
of child care
provided. Their
study is based on
an in-depth
survey of 75 mid
size, relatively
high-quality child care centers located
in an economically thriving region.
Part I of the book focuses on staff
departures and center quality. It relates
the types and magnitude of turnover
occurring among teachers at child care
centers to the level of quality provided
there. Part II relies on in-depth,
quantitative evidence to examine the
experience of child care employment.
Whitebook and Sakai point out
interesting relationships between the
characteristics of the child care
workforce and those who have chosen
to leave, stay, or join on. They then
discuss work and family decisions that
impact child care workers' career
decisions, including the rewards listed
by workers as reasons they remain
employed in child care. The authors
conclude with three policy
recommendations that echo the
suggestions made to them by the
teaching staff and directors
interviewed in their survey.
145 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-301-4 / $16
paper ISBN 0-88099-300-6. 2004.

Due to a
variety of social
and economic
factors (e.g.,
welfare reform
andtheEITC), a
growing number
of women found it
necessary to enter
the labor force
during the last 25
years. This includes a dramatic
increase in the labor force participation
rate of mothers with young children.
Experts see this trend continuing, so
the question becomes, "Who takes care
of the children when a work/family
conflict arises?"
Faced with a the tight labor market
of the 1990s, a small but growing
number of employers began offering
on-site employer-sponsored child care
(ESCC) as a way to attract enough
workers to meet their staffing needs.
Connelly, DeGraff, and Willis
examine the trends in the growth of
such child care programs, then employ
a case study approach to seek answers
to a number of pertinent questions,
including 1) Why do some firms offer
ESCC while most firms do not?
2) What is the value to firms offering
ESCC? 3) What is the value to
employees of working for a firm
offering on-site child care?
180 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-305-7 / $17
paper ISBN 0-88099-304-9 / 2004.

The Economics of
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of the Family and Medical Leave Act
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Included are
Federal Child Care Policy,
David M. Blau
• Thinking about Child Care Policy,
Barbara Bergmann
• Parents' Work Time and the Family,
Cordelia W. Reimers
• Fertility, Public Policy, and Mothers
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